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Employee Perks in Silicon Valley:
Technology Companies Lead the “Arms
Race” as Corporate Law Trails in
Representing Shareholder Interests
Thuy Nguyen*
I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of providing “in-kind” perks to employees that go
beyond the traditional benefits of health care coverage and retirement
plans has spread throughout Silicon Valley technology companies at a
rapid pace within the last decade.1 At the same time, the value of these
perks has increased exponentially.2 The widespread adoption of this
practice suggests that employers view the practice as beneficial to their
business strategy in two interrelated ways. First, corporate directors and
officials view the practice as a tool to recruit talent, boost productivity,
and increase efficiency. Second, companies have typically been able to
avoid paying taxes on the majority of the in-kind perks they provide to
employees.3
From a shareholder governance perspective, however, there are
substantial weaknesses in these two approaches. With respect to
developing human resources in general, there is currently no accurate
metric for measuring how the receipt of in-kind perks contributes to an
employee’s work performance. Thus, shareholders are unable to
* I wish to thank Professor Jared Ellias for the expertise and guidance he provided throughout this
entire process. I would also like to thank Hastings Business Law Journal’s Editorial Board for their hard
work in editing this Note, as well as the Executive Board for their encouragement. Lastly, this Note
would not have been possible without the unwavering support from my friends and family, especially my
parents.
1. John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 290 (2013).
2. Ian Sherr, Vexed in the City: Working in Silicon Valley Tech Is Much More Lucrative Than You
Think, CNET (Aug. 21, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/vexed-in-the-city-working-insilicon-valley-tech-is-much-more-lucrative-than-you-think/.
3. Id.
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properly assess whether the costs associated with in-kind perks
ultimately decrease or increase share value. In addition, should
shareholders wish to question the use of corporate funds to provide
lavish perks, there is no effective avenue of recourse under the
current corporate legal framework.
With respect to the tax
advantages associated with providing in-kind perks, while this
practice has enjoyed rapid exponential growth uninterrupted for the
most part, the law is beginning to catch up. Several scholars have
argued that the majority of perks offered fail to qualify for the type of
tax breaks that the law intended.4 In response, the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) has expressed the intent to revise the tax code based
on these recommendations.5 The IRS’s interest in monitoring and
regulating in-kind perks in Silicon Valley thereby casts doubt on the
financial advantages of this practice.
This Note addresses this issue by proceeding in three main parts:
Part I surveys the types of perks offered by employers, Part II
analyzes the impact of impending changes to the practice of
employer-provided perks, and Part III criticizes the ineffectiveness of
the current legal avenue shareholders might pursue to effect change
and summarizes an interim solution. Ultimately, this Note seeks to
identify significant gaps in the practice of employer provided perks, in
order to foster a conversation between shareholders and management
regarding the long-term consequences of this practice.
II. RISE OF EMPLOYEE PERKS IN SILICON VALLEY
In order to understand the implications of employer-provided
perks, it is important to first examine the current landscape. This
section will define the geographical boundaries of which the perks are
concentrated; the demographic to which the perks are directed; and
the perks themselves, in terms of type, scale, and value.
Starting in the 1990s, the technology industry in Silicon Valley
4. See, e.g., Austin L. Lomax, Note, Five-Star Exclusion: Modern Silicon Valley
Companies Are Pushing the Limits of Section 119 by Providing Tax-Free Meals to Employees,
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2077, 2105 (2014).
5. Mark Maremont, Silicon Valley Cafeterias Whet Appetite of IRS, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2,
2014, at B1, http://www.wsj.com/articles/silicon-valley-cafeterias-whet-appetite-of-irs-140961
2488.
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has cultivated a reputation for not only offering employees
substantial pay,6 but also lavish perks.7 In terms of location, the
Silicon Valley area is generally known to encompass the following:8
all of the Santa Clara, San Mateo, and San Francisco counties;
Fremont, Newark, and Union City of Alameda County; and Scotts
Valley of Santa Cruz County.9 With respect to the beneficiaries of
these perks, technology companies generally craft benefits packages
specifically geared towards engineers, software experts, coding
whizzes, and other key workers.10 These employees are known as the
“backbone of the industry’s current boom.”11
Silicon Valley technology companies offer perks in varying
degrees of type, scale, and value. Some employers offer limited
perks.12 For example, a local research lab for IBM subsidizes lunches
for employees.13 Similarly, employees at Apple must pay to use the
on-campus gym, but the company offers subsidized lunch, free coffee,
tea, and apples.14
Yet, most companies provide completely subsidized perks
frequently, or even daily. For example, Google employees are
encouraged to dine at any one of the cafeterias and eateries on
campus completely free of charge.15 Smaller companies with more
6. Before the practice of providing employee perks began attaining momentum, Silicon
Valley companies utilized stock options to attract and retain employees, which is now
considered a standard benefit. See Alisa J. Baker, Stock Options–A Perk that Built Silicon
Valley, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1992, at A20.
7. Paul Caron, Who Pays for Employee Perks at High-Tech Companies?, TAXPROF BLOG
(Nov. 25, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/11/who-pays-for-employee-perks.html.
8. While the Silicon Valley is generally known loosely as the “Bay Area,” there is not a
universal agreement on the precise geographical boundaries of the region.
9. While the Silicon Valley Index doesn’t faithfully include the county of San Francisco, it
is included in this note because of the increasing presence of high tech companies in San
Francisco and consequently, the spread of employee perks. See Profile of Silicon Valley,
SILICON VALLEY INDEX, http://www.siliconvalleyindex.org/index.php/profile-of-the-region (last
visited Oct. 1, 2015).
10. Caron, supra note 7.
11. Sherr, supra note 2.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Lomax, supra note 4 (citing Kevin Smith, Google Employees Reveal Their Favorite
Perks Working for the Company, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 6, 2013, 11:02 AM), http:// www.busin
essinsider.com/google-employee-favorite-perks-2013-3?op=1 (listing a variety of employee
reactions to the many perks that Google offers)).
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limited office space employ the services of local catering companies.16
Genentech, a biotechnology corporation headquartered in South San
Francisco, provides take-home dinners and helps employees find lastminute care for sick children.17 Many companies throughout Silicon
Valley offer buses equipped with wireless Internet (“Wi-Fi”) to
transport employees to and from work, allowing them the luxury of
working while commuting.18 Evernote, a productivity app maker
headquartered in Redwood City, offers free house-cleaning services
twice a month to every full-time worker, from receptionists to top
executives.19 Employees at other companies, including Netflix and
Twitter, enjoy unlimited vacation time.20
Other perks are offered intermittently.
For instance,
ThousandEyes, a network monitoring company based in San
Francisco, brought employees to Lake Tahoe for three days in the
summer.21 For one of those days, the company provided employees
with vouchers for recreational activities, including zip lining, golfing,
and boating.22 Employees at Evernote receive a $1,000 stipend to
“disconnect from work” each year.23
Some perks verge on extravagant, or even excessive. At
Dropcam, a company that manufactures live-streaming cameras,
CEO Greg Duffy welcomes employees by offering free helicopter
rides to the destination of their choice.24
Company perks even extend to employee families as well. For
instance, some companies offer employees money to help offset costs
of childbirth and adoptions.25 When employees at Yahoo adopt or
give birth to a child, they are given $500, a gift basket, and up to eight
16. Cadie Thompson, Silicon Valley Start-Ups Take Perks to New Level, CNBC (Aug. 19,
2013, 1:50 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100971904.
17. John C. Goodman, Silicon Valley Employers Go Wild with Lavish Employee Benefits,
FORBES (Oct. 30, 2012, 9:17 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoodman/2012/10/30/siliconvalley-employers-go-wild-with-lavish-employee-benefits/.
18. Sherr, supra note 2.
19. Matt Richtel, Housecleaning, Then Dinner? Silicon Valley Perks Come Home, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/us/in-silicon-valley-perks-now-beginat-home.html?_r=0.
20. Sherr, supra note 2.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Thompson, supra note 16.
25. Sherr, supra note 2.
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weeks of paid leave.26 Similarly, Google gives $500 “baby bonding
bucks” along with up to twenty-two weeks leave for biological
moms.27 At Facebook, employees are given a gift of $4,000 and
approximately sixteen weeks of maternity leave.28
Still, other perks simply buck tradition. Two Silicon Valley
giants, Apple and Facebook, now offer female employees the “gamechanging” perk of covering the costs to undergo medical procedures
to freeze and store their eggs.29 At both companies, the benefits plan
covers up to $20,000 in medical procedures and costs.30 Employees at
Facebook began taking advantage of the coverage in 2014.31
To be sure, not all companies participate in the perks game. For
instance, the head of the human resources software startup Zenefits
argued that he abstains from offering too many of the Silicon Valley
staples to his employees for fear of attracting employees who join the
company purely for perks.32 However, companies that refrain from
providing extensive perks “are becoming the exception, not the
rule.”33
The competition to see which companies can devise and dole out
the most desired and original perks has been characterized as an
“arms race.”34 Silicon Valley employers strive to outdo each other in
terms of nonsalary and nonequity benefits.35 ThousandEyes CEO
Mohit Lad describes the practice as an effort to be original.36 It goes
beyond “just giving free lunches,” but further, it is about cultivating a
unique corporate “identity.”37 In fact, the practice has become so
prevalent that a new sub-industry has surfaced.38 Companies are
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Danielle Friedman, Perk Up: Facebook and Apple Now Pay for Women to Freeze
Eggs, NBC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2014, 2:56 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/perk-face
book-apple-now-pay-women-freeze-eggs-n225011.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Sherr, supra note 2.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Flora Zhang, Twitter Buys 19th Century Log Cabins for Cafeteria, CNN: MONEY (Mar.
6, 2014, 10:38 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/06/technology/social/twitter-cabins/.
36. Sherr, supra note 2.
37. Sherr, supra note 2.
38. Rachel Feintzeig, Lavish Perks Spawn New Job Category, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2014, 7:19
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retaining human resources (“HR”) specialists and tasking them with
looking for more creative, often valuable benefits.39 For some
companies and HR specialists, the expectations are beginning to
become too much to handle. Jill Hernstat, a recruiter at executive
search firm Hernstat & Co., observed that prospective or current
employees would often broadcast the perks they received at their
former job.40 The expectation then would be for the new employer to
offer more perks than the former employer, or at the very least, make
a matching offer. This is the practice that Hernstat has characterized
as spiraling to the point where it has become “out of hand.”41
Obviously, the practice impacts two main classes of people: (1)
the employers, including the management team, and (2) the
employees. However, the increasingly prevalent role that employerprovided perks play in the human resources component of Silicon
Valley technology companies should draw the attention of another
class of key stakeholders: corporate shareholders.
III. THE SHAREHOLDER GOVERNANCE PROBLEM
Given the volume and enormous costs associated with the
practice of providing perks, it follows that corporate shareholders
have a strong interest in the underlying business rationale of the
policy, and potentially, any options available to exercise their rights as
shareholders. While these increasingly extravagant perks have
garnered considerable attention from the government and the public,
less attention has been paid to corporate shareholders. Specifically,
there is little, if any, literature available analyzing how these perks
affect shareholder value. If the value of employee benefits remained
stagnant, then the concern would not be as pronounced. However,
the alarming rate at which the benefits have spread throughout
technology companies in Silicon Valley—combined with the soaring
costs and value of the benefits—warrants a closer examination of the
legal and business ramifications as they relate to shareholders. This
PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/lavish-perks-spawn-new-job-category-1416529198; Caron, supra
note 7.
39. Feintzeig, supra note 38.
40. Sherr, supra note 2.
41. Id.
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section will outline the business rationales corporate executives offer
to support the practice of providing employee perks, and explain how
impending changes in tax law affect the wisdom of these business
rationales.
A. INTENDED PURPOSES OF EMPLOYEE PERKS
The history of Silicon Valley involves intense competition for
employees with competent engineering skills, a phenomenon
described as an “insatiable demand for engineering talent.”42 As
early as the 1970s, the practice of providing perks evolved as a
method for companies to vigorously compete in the market for
talent.43 Companies began to offer “incentives such as generous
signing bonuses, stock options, high salaries, and interesting projects
to attract top people.”44 These aggressive recruiting practices
progressed through the 1980s and into the 1990s.45 While the demand
for engineers diminished in the years following the burst of the dotcom bubble, it quickly swelled again less than a decade later.46 One
expert described the market for engineering talent in Silicon Valley
by 2011 as “the most competitive” he had ever seen.47 Today,
companies continue to maintain the mindset that paying engineers
“like superstars” is the only way to compete in Silicon Valley’s
“hypercompetitive” job market.48 Despite the significant costs
associated from these employee perks, companies nonetheless justify
the practice on three main grounds: the perks serve to increase
productivity, recruit talent, and retain valuable human resources.

1.

Efficiency

42. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 1, at 290.
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 35 (9th prtg. 2000)).
45. Coyle & Polsky, supra note 1, at 290–91 (citations omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 291 (citing Jessica Guynn, What Recession? It’s Boom Time Again in Silicon
Valley, L.A. TIMES (July 17, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/17/business/la-fi-techboom-20110717).
48. Daniel Terdiman, Silicon Valley Talent Wars: Engineers, Come Get Your $250K
Salary, CNET (Sept. 22, 2014, 4:00 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/silicon-valley-talent-warsengineers-come-get-your-250k-salary/.
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First, most companies justify the policy of providing perks on the
basis that the perks help employees perform more efficiently.49
Scientific research seems to support this rationale.
Research
conducted by psychology experts revealed that social and relaxing
activities, such as yoga and cardio-kickboxing, tend to increase
creativity.50 These activities cause a spike in the superior anterior
temporal gyrus (“aSTG”), the part of the brain responsible for
drawing together distantly-related information.51 In turn, a spike of
aSTG enhances creativity, engagement, and innovation.52 As a result,
engineers who experience this surge can more efficiently perform
their job.53
On a practical level, the perks simply save employees time,
freeing up valuable time that could otherwise be spent working.54 For
example, if the employer provides a barber on office premises,
employees would not need to spend time waiting at a salon.55
Hewlett-Packard, Facebook, Google, and Apple provide doctors and
health clinics on campus, thereby saving employees from cutting their
workday short to attend an off-site medical appointment.56 Buses
equipped with Wi-Fi allow employees to work during the commute.57
One study conducted by the University of California, Berkeley,58

49. John Waggoner, Do Happy Workers Mean Higher Company Profits?, USA TODAY:
MONEY (Feb. 20, 2013, 3:32 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/
2013/02/19/ treating-employees-well-stock-price/1839887/.
50. John Kounios & Mark Beeman, The Aha! Moment: The Neural Basis of Solving
Problems with Insight, THE CREATIVITY POST (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.creativitypost.com/
science/the_aha_moment._the_cognitive_neuroscience_of_insight#sthash.ztgdhNqU.dpuf; see
also Jonah Lehrer, How To Be Creative, WALL ST. J., (Mar. 12, 2012, 6:25 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203370604577265632205015846.
51. See supra note 50.
52. Id.
53. Martha Mendoza, Tech Firms Offering More Perks To Recruit, Retain Talent,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 31, 2013, 10:54 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/31/techfirms-increase-office-perks_n_2988687.html.
54. Id.
55. Sherr, supra note 2.
56. Id.; Zhang, supra note 35.
57. Sherr, supra note 2.
58. Danielle Dai & David Weinzimmer, Riding First Class: Impacts of Silicon Valley
Shuttles on Commute & Residential Location Choice (U.C. Berkeley, Working Paper No.
UCB-ITS-WP-2014-01, Feb. 2014), http://www.danielledai.com/academic/dai-weinzimmer-shut
tles.pdf.
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found that ten percent of technology employees surveyed would quit
if their employers stopped providing shuttle service to and from the
worksite.59 Paul Saffo, Stanford University lecturer and managing
director of Foresight at Discern Analytics stated, “[o]utsiders see
these things as an extravagance; the companies see them as a
productivity tool.”60

2.

Recruiting and Retaining Talent

Another driving force behind the practice of offering extensive
perks is the necessity to attract and retain talent.61 The perks benefit
employers in two stages: when the employer is initially looking for
suitable candidates, and when the candidates become employees.
During the former stage, the benefit to the employers is fairly
straightforward: the perks attract a larger pool of candidates, from
which the employer may select qualified employees. As a general
rule, more is better. Simply put: If a prospective employee were
facing two job opportunities that offered the same salary—all other
things being equal—the employee would likely choose the company
that offered an additional perk over the other company.
During the latter stage, the employer benefits when the perks
give employees a heightened sense of job satisfaction, inducing them
to stay with the company. In addition to the obvious need to hold on
to talent, employers need to retain employees in order to safeguard
company secrets. Because of technological advances and greater
employment mobility, employers are becoming increasingly
concerned with trade secret misappropriation in the employment
arena.62 In Silicon Valley, trade secret law is particularly important
because intellectual property is one of the most valuable assets to
technology companies in the area.63 Companies are concerned about
trade secret misappropriation, both during the time an employee is
away from the workplace, as well as during the period following an
Dai & Weinzimmer, supra note 58, at 12.
Zhang, supra note 35.
Mendoza, supra note 53.
Hanna Bui-Eve, Note, To Hire or Not to Hire: What Silicon Valley Companies Should
Know About Hiring Competitors’ Employees, 48 HASTINGS L.J 981, 993 (1997).
63. Bui-Eve, supra note 62.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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employee’s termination.64 In the former situation, employers fear
that employees could disclose company secrets off campus. Thus,
companies often provide perks that encourage shorter breaks and
longer hours spent at the office, such as the famous “sleep pods”
provided at Google.65
In the latter situation, businesses have become more concerned
with the prospect of losing their intellectual properties through
departing employees.66 Traditionally, fearing possible disclosure of its
technological knowledge, loss of the employee’s expertise, and the
subsequent loss of its competitive advantage, former employers sue to
enjoin the disclosure or use of its trade secrets; alternatively, former
employers sue to enjoin the departed employee from assuming
similar responsibilities in his new job.67 However, because covenants
not to compete are generally unenforceable in California, employers
must rely on these perks to fill this gap.
Furthermore, there is an additional advantage to offering perks
over a higher salary or stock options. Paying employees in perks
delivers a substantial “amount of utility in the short term, none of
which can be saved until later periods.”68 As some scholars suggest,
good perks are generally “extravagant and non-fungible”—these
types of perks “cannot be easily convertible to cash, as that would
enable the employee to save.”69 For instance, paying for an
employee’s regular haircut is a non-extravagant and fungible perk,
because this is an expense that the employee would normally incur
anyway; “the employee simply pockets the amount of the transfer in

64. Id. at 984.
65. Michael Moran, Google Has Sleep Pods, Yelp Has Beer—Why Don’t We Just Live at
Work?, GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2014, 6:57 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2014/sep/11/google-sleep-pods-yelp-beer-work-leisure-offices; Zoe Mintz, IRS Plans to Tax Free
Meals Silicon Valley Companies Dole Out, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014, 4:48 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/irs-plans-tax-free-meals-silicon-valley-companies-dole-out-1679106.
66. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case: The Growing Debate over Employee Mobility,
KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON (Apr. 30, 2014), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/siliconvalleys-poaching-case-growing-debate-employee-mobility/; Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal

Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and
Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 577–78 (1999).
67. Bui-Eve, supra note 62, at 985–86.
68. M. Todd Henderson & James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks,
Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, 93 GEO. L.J. 1835, 1863–64 (2005).
69. Id. at 1874–75.
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cash.”70 In contrast, paying for a professional makeover would
constitute a good perk, because it involves a luxury that the employee
would not normally purchase.71 These “good perks”—the type that a
majority of Silicon Valley technology companies offer—give
employees incentives to work harder, but do not allow employees to
save for future periods. As a result, they provide an incentive for the
employee to remain with the company in order to continue receiving
such benefits.72
The need to recruit and retain talent is particularly acute when
other potentially more effective, cost-efficient methods are
impractical or no longer available. For instance, the practice of
“acqui-hiring” is one such method that is not available to all
companies.73 “Acqui-hiring” is a “novel and increasingly common
tool” by which the large and successful technology companies buy
startups in order to satisfy their intense demand for engineering
talent.74 In an “acqui-hiring” transaction, the corporate buyer has
little interest in acquiring the startup’s projects or assets.75 Instead,
the primary motivation is to hire, by acquisition, the startup’s
engineers.76 Thus, the buyer benefits by obtaining the services of
engineers and entrepreneurs with expertise in a certain field.77 Many
Silicon Valley giants, including Facebook and Google, are engaging in
“acqui-hiring” at a rapid pace.78 However, smaller companies are
priced out of this method because only the larger companies with
sufficient capital can afford to execute such complex transactions.
Therefore, the vast majority of Silicon Valley companies that wish to
stay competitive in the market continue to use the practice of perks to
attract and retain talent.
Companies have also attempted, unsuccessfully for the most part,
to incorporate noncompete agreements or contracts to prevent

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Henderson & Spindler, supra note 68, at 1874.
Id. at 1874–75.
Id. at 1863–64.
See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 1.
Id. at 281.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 283.
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employees from working for competitors.79 Peter Cappelli, Wharton
Management Professor and Director of Wharton’s Center for Human
Resources, explained that one of the reasons this tactic is unlawful is
because no-poaching agreements are unfair to employees.80 The
practice violates both antitrust principles and employment laws.81
Fundamentally, it “benefits the companies at the expense of their
employees.”82 In California particularly, this practice poses a “unique
problem” because of the difficulty in enforcing noncompete
agreements.83 Therefore, the better practice in “terms of carrots and
sticks” is for companies to make it attractive enough for employees
not to leave and also more difficult for them to walk away with
intellectual capital.84
A third method for recruiting talent which has become
unavailable is a practice known as “no-poaching,” in which companies
conspire to avoid hiring each other’s employees.85 Professor of
business economics and public policy at Wharton University, Joseph
Harrington, describes the no-poaching agreement as “an
unreasonable restraint of trade” and “a violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.”86 When companies agree not to
compete for each other’s employees, the result is that workers receive
lower wages because of the lack of competition.87 This method is
likely to have been shut down by a class action lawsuit brought
against Apple, Google, Intel, and Adobe Systems that was recently
settled.88 While the companies avoided having to testify in court and
risk the public peeking behind the curtain of their strategies, the
negative attention and the threat of a lawsuit potentially serves as a
deterrent to companies contemplating this method of retaining talent
79. Gilson, supra note 66, at 578.
80. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 66.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Jeff Elder, Tech Companies Agree to Settle Wage Suit, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2014, 6:58
PM), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304788404579522012693196966?mg=
reno64-wsj&url=http3A2F2Fonline.wsj.com2Farticle2FSB10001424052702304788404579522012
693196966.html.
86. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 66.
87. Elder, supra note 85.
88. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 66.
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in the near future.89 Following this setback, the companies returned
to depending on perks as a primary recruitment and retention tool.
In light of the diminishing effectiveness of these tried practices, it
seems logical that Silicon Valley companies embrace and commit to a
policy of offering lavish employee perks.
B.
DO THE BENEFITS REALLY FULFILL THEIR INTENDED
PURPOSE?
Proponents argue that statistical data supports a robust policy of
providing employee perks.90 One of the ways to determine whether
employee perks actually fulfill their purpose is to measure return on
investment (“ROI”).91 ROI is a commonly used performance
measure that evaluates the efficiency of an investment or compares
the efficiency of a number of different investments.92 To calculate
ROI, the benefit of an investment is divided by the cost of the
investment.93 According to Incentive Magazine, Fortune’s “100 Best
Companies to Work For” that offer “carefully crafted employee
benefits package[s]” have reported a 10.6 percent annual return since
1998.94 On the contrary, “companies with 40 percent or less employee
engagement had a total shareholder return that was 44 percent lower
than average.”95 Companies with more engaged employees produce
twenty-nine percent more revenue on average, report a higher
average customer loyalty, and boast higher retention rates of
approximately forty-four percent.96
Another rationale propelled by Silicon Valley employers is that
perks lead to employee satisfaction, and thus retention. Arguably,
there is a direct correlation between happy employees and higher
89. Silicon Valley’s No-Poaching Case, supra note 66.
90. John Feldmann, Do Employee Perks Translate Into Employer ROI?, UNDERCOVER
RECRUITER, http://theundercoverrecruiter.com/employee-perks-translate-employer-roi/ (last
visited Oct. 2, 2015).
91. Id.
92. Return on Investment (ROI), ENTREPRENEUR: SMALL BUS. ENCYCLOPEDIA,
http://www.entrepreneur.com/encyclopedia/return-on-investment-roi (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
93. Id.
94. Bruce Shutan, The Power of Perks, INCENTIVE MAG. (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.
incentivemag.com/Strategy/Engagement/The-Power-of-Perks/.
95. Feldmann, supra note 90.
96. Id.
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company profits, which in turn benefits shareholders. For example,
Google, notorious for the assortment of perks it provides for its
employees, has seen its stock soar 674 percent since the company
began using perks in August 2004.97 The simple reasoning that people
enjoy the benefits of perks is not the only argument for which
companies treat employees well.98 Employers who endorse the policy
refer to data, which strongly supports the “fact that organizations that
focus on the engagement of their employees deliver stronger
performance.”99
While the policy directly affects employee
happiness, the policy is founded on sensible business strategies.100
This business strategy involves providing employees with a sense of
“engagement,” which in turn results in higher productivity, lower
turnover rates, cost savings, and an earnest desire to work for the
good of the company.101
Slater Tow, a Facebook spokesperson, said the company was not
trying to be New Age, but simply strategic. “We don’t want to give
aromatherapy for your dog,” he said, “[w]e want things that are
functional for you and your family.”102 Google’s co-founders Larry
Page and Sergey Brin expressed similar sentiments in their IPO letter:
“We believe it is easy to be penny wise and pound foolish with
respect to benefits that can save employees considerable time and
improve their health and productivity.” And that employees and
shareholders alike should “[e]xpect [Google] to add benefits rather
than pare them down over time.”103 These statements presume that
the benefits are fulfilling their intended purposes.
To the extent that lavish employee perks recruit and retain talent
and prevent the disclosure of proprietary information, the perks
provide value to the companies, and consequently, corporate
shareholders. However, the increasingly extravagant nature of
employee perks begs the question of whether such perks are

97. Waggoner, supra note 49.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Richtel, supra note 19.
103. 2004 Founders’ IPO Letter, GOOGLE INVESTOR RELATIONS (Aug. 18, 2004), https://
investor.google.com/corporate/2004/ipo-founders-letter.html.
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functional and optimal, or simply a waste of corporate resources.104
Sophie Kitson, Vice President of Talent, People + Vibe at PagerDuty,
insists that “the tech boom won’t be here forever” and eventually
employers “will regret inflating perks and salaries as the way to
engage” employees.105
As an immediate result, the immense
competition and density of employers in the Silicon Valley could lead
to retention problems.106 Employees are “constantly tempted to jump
employers, even if only to consistently bump up their
compensation.”107
C. THE EFFECT OF IMPENDING TAX LAW CHANGES
Even assuming that the perks are currently fulfilling their stated
purposes, impending changes in tax law should concern shareholders
with respect to corporate governance. Recruiters report that the
difference in perk value may be as much as twenty percent above an
employee’s salary.108 Thus, a software engineer at Facebook, Twitter,
or Google who earns approximately $120,000 a year in salary on
paper actually receives up to an additional $24,000 in benefits.109
However, these additional benefits are not reflected in the
employee’s paycheck. These perks are not technically free, but rather
an alternative to paying higher wages.110 Under the current system,
neither the company nor the employee is shouldering any taxes on
the majority of employee perks.111
Economic policy expert John C. Goodman described the
business rationale underlying the practice of providing extensive

104. Sophie Kitson, Perks Don’t Work, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 11, 2014), http://techcrunch.co
m /2014/12/11/perks-dont-work.
105. Kitson, supra note 104.
106. See Ed Nathanson, A Tale of Two Coasts: How Companies Compete for Talent in
Boston vs. Silicon Valley (Jan. 7, 2015), http://talent.linkedin.com/blog/index.php/2015/01/a-taleof-two-coasts-how-companies-compete-for-talent-in-boston-vs-silicon-valley.
Massachusettsbased CloudLock CEO Gil Zimmerman postulates that employer density and competition in
Silicon Valley causes employees to leave businesses in search of greater compensation
elsewhere.
107. Id.
108. Sherr, supra note 2.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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perks, from an economic perspective.112 Using the 2012 tax rates,
Goodman explains how the perks make mathematical, and logical,
sense to employers. Taking into account the highest marginal tax rate
for the federal income tax of thirty-five percent, the 2.9 percent
Medicare tax, and the maximum 9.3 percent state income tax, an
individual in California would face a highest marginal tax rate of 47.2
percent.113 Californians with a median income face high marginal tax
rates, because a 9.3 percent rate is applied to those with less than
$100,000 annual income.114 For a Californian in the twenty-five
percent federal income tax bracket, facing a 15.3 percent (Federal
Insurance Contributions Act) payroll tax and a 9.3 percent California
income tax, the combined marginal tax rate reaches almost fifty
percent.115 Consequently, both the individual and the employer are
incentivized to spend up to forty-nine cents to avoid a dollar of
income.116 Under this logic, California employers are presuming that
employees would choose to receive a dollar’s worth of goods and
services in-kind rather than fifty-one cents in cash.117 Thus, even if
the benefit is worth half its cost, it would still “be a good deal for the
employees.”118 This is the combined effect of the progressive tax
system and the fact that neither employers nor employees are paying
taxes on these perks.
This pattern is an outgrowth of the Internal Revenue Code § 132,
which governs de minimis fringe benefits.119 De minimis fringe
benefits are defined as “any property or service the value of which is
(after taking into account the frequency with which similar fringes are
provided by the employer to their employees) so small as to make
accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”120
The Treasury Department provides a few examples of excludable
benefits: personal use of the copying machine; occasional theater or

112. Goodman, supra note 17.
113. Id. (These tax rates are current through the writing of the article in 2012).
114. Id.
115. Id. (These tax rates are current through the writing of the artice in 2012).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Sherr, supra note 2.
120. 26 U.S.C. § 132(e)(1) (2013). For a detailed argument explaining why free meals
provided by employers should be taxed, see Lomax, supra note 4.
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sporting event tickets; occasional parties or group meals; holiday gifts
of property; coffee, donuts, and soft drinks; and other similar
incidentals.121 It also provides instances of non-excludable fringe
benefits, such as season tickets, country club or gym memberships,
and use of corporate recreation facilities like hunting lodges or
boats.122 Whether a benefit is de minimis often turns on the
frequency with which the employee receives the benefit.123 A
taxpayer must measure the frequency of the benefit in one of two
ways. Primarily, frequency depends on how often an individual
employee receives a particular benefit, rather than how often the
total workforce receives a particular benefit.124 If it is difficult to
determine how often an individual employee receives a benefit, then
the taxpayer can determine frequency based on how much the
employer provides the benefit to the entire workforce.125 These
regulations indicate that receiving a daily benefit likely does not
constitute de minimis fringe benefit.126
However, the extensive benefits that technology companies are
giving their employees are eliciting questions about “who foots the
bill for the perks.”127 In particular, these lavish benefits have
attracted the attention of the IRS. A recent Wall Street Journal
report reveals that the IRS could be targeting these fringe benefits,
more specifically “employer-provided meals,” for the next fiscal
year.128 In the agency’s recently released Priority Guidance Plan for
121. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (2013) (listing these examples and others that are
excludable under I.R.C. § 132).
122. Id.
123. See 26 U.S.C. § 132(e)(1) (2012) (noting that the taxpayers must account for the
frequency they receive the benefit in question when determining that benefit’s value).
124. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6(b)(1) (noting that this “employee-measured” way of
determining frequency does not allow an employee to exclude a benefit provided infrequently
to the entire workforce if he receives that benefit every day).
125. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.132-6(b)(2) (stating the individual frequency is not important in
circumstances when it is difficult to measure).
126. Several scholars have argued that perks such as free meals do not constitute de minimis
fringe benefits, and thus should be taxed by the IRS. See generally Lomax, supra note 4, at 2090
(citing Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(b)(1) (“For example, if an employer provides a free meal in-kind to
one employee on a daily basis, but not to any other employee, the value of the meals is not de
minimis with respect to that one employee”)).
127. Erik Sherman, Who Pays for Employee Perks at High-Tech Companies?, CBS
MONEYWATCH (Nov. 24, 2014, 12:32 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/who-pays-for-perksat-high-tech-companies/.
128. Maremont, supra note 5.
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2014 to 2015, the IRS states that the free meals will now be
considered a taxable fringe benefit, receiving the same treatment as
that of a company car or phone.129 As a result, employees who
receive two meals a day, courtesy of their company, could be
obligated to pay an additional $4,000 to $5,000 in taxes.130
One driving force behind the IRS’s newfound attention is that
taxpayers are beginning to realize and decry the consequences of
these employee perks. The current tax policies regarding employerprovided perks benefit companies at the expense of public
taxpayers.131 If companies are not required to pay taxes for the meals,
there will be fewer tax dollars to pay for government services and
other programs.132 Therefore, in a sense, taxpayers are subsidizing
free cafeteria meals for some of the most profitable companies in the
nation, which happen to be centrally located in one geographical
area.133
Similarly, residents have expressed resentment towards shuttles
transporting employees to and from San Francisco, a prime location
where most Silicon Valley technology employees have chosen to
live.134 Many shuttle stops are located at public bus stops, and the
shuttles occasionally impede access to public vehicles or block
bicycles and auto traffic.135 Residents have also raised complaints
about noise and vibrations from shuttles, particularly on residential
Moreover, there is anecdotal evidence that some
streets.136
technology employees choose to live close to shuttle stops, causing
real estate prices to rise further and gentrify portions of San
Francisco.137 While perks such as these shuttle buses benefit Silicon
129. See generally Lomax, supra note 4, at 2090.
130. Mark Maremont, Silicon Valley's Mouthwatering Tax Break, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2013,
7:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324050304578408461566171752.
131. Kim Peterson, IRS Says No to Free Silicon Valley Meals, CBS NEWS (Sept. 3, 2014, 7:27
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/irs-says-no-to-free-silicon-valley-meals/.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Neal J. Riley, Supervisor Wants Rules for Shuttle Stops, S.F. CHRON. (Oct. 25, 2012,
5:21 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Supervisor-wants-rules-for-shuttle-stops-3982
606.php.
135. Id.
136. S.F. CNTY. TRANSP. AUTH., STRATEGIC ANALYSIS REPORT: THE ROLE OF SHUTTLE
SERVICES IN SAN FRANCISCO’S TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 5 (2011).
137. Rory Carroll, Geek-Driven Gentrification Threatens San Francisco’s Bohemian
Appeal, GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/
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Valley employees and employers,138 they are beginning to impact
third parties as well.
If the IRS makes good on its promise to begin taxing employee
perks and Silicon Valley continues to offer these “expected” perks,
the money spent will ultimately come out of shareholder value.139
This becomes particularly problematic when a company that
succumbed to pressure of offering generous perks suddenly begins to
struggle. For example, Zynga, a social gaming company, used to
serve employees fancy lunches and dinners every day.140 However, as
some of Zynga’s former titles have begun to decline in popularity, the
company’s shares in turn have fallen eighty percent since 2012.141
Unsurprisingly, Zynga cut back on certain perks, including ending
haircuts to employees in early 2014.142 However, regardless of
whether Silicon Valley companies may continue providing perks
under the current scheme, shareholders may still have a vested
interest in examining employee perks more closely from a corporate
governance perspective.
IV. AN INADEQUATE SYSTEM
OF MEASURING THE VALUE OF PERKS
Even without the changes in tax law, shareholders face a
considerable challenge in approaching the issue of employee perks: a
deficient system in measuring the benefit the employee is receiving,
and consequently, shareholder value. The practice of providing perks
is premised on the theory that employees are receiving a benefit, and
that benefit is what drives an employee’s motivation, efficiency,
productivity, or desire to stay at the employee’s respective job. As
05/san-francisco-geek-gentrification-threatens; Miguel Helft, Google’s Buses Help its Workers
Beat the Rush, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/10/technology/
10google.html; Kevin Roose, The Commuter Kings: Riding Along on Silicon Valley’s Exclusive
Shuttles, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 26, 2012, 10:54 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/12/
silicon-valleys-exclusive-shuttles.html; Jenny Pisillo, Paying More to Be Near a Company
Shuttle Stop, SFGATE (Mar. 9, 2012, 9:30 AM), http://blog.sfgate.com/ontheblock/2012/03/19/
paying-more-to-be-near-a-company-shuttle-stop/.
138. See Sherr, supra note 2.
139. Sherman, supra note 127.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.

70

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 12:1

Professor Jay Soled points out, receipt of in-kind benefits is
profoundly difficult to value.143 For example, how does one measure
the value of a private helicopter ride with the CEO of the
company?144
When employees receive in-kind benefits, their
consumption choices are typically constrained.145 Consequently, a tax
on the fair market value of the benefits the employee receives is
improper.146 Nevertheless, there is little doubt that those individuals
who actually consume the benefit have experienced “a taxable
accretion to wealth.”147 What emerges from this scheme is a “riddle”
about just how much one has benefitted, and how to accurately
measure the value of that benefit.148
A system of providing in-kind perks makes calculating
employee compensation more complex. Under the traditional
structure of compensation, employees are compensated in cash, with
benefits such as health care standardized for the most part.
Accordingly, shareholders would be able to access a reliable and
transparent system of measuring employee compensation.
Conversely, in-kind perks are not consumed by all employees, and for
the ones who do benefit, it is difficult to measure the level of
consumption. For example, engineers in a company may all have
access to free cardio-kickboxing classes. One engineer may take
advantage of this perk and attend every evening class available. In
this scenario, the employee has received something of value that gives
them motivation to work harder and the employer has benefitted
from having a more satisfied and productive employee.149 However,
another engineer tries a class out, and decides to never come back. In
this alternative situation, the employer has expended financial
resources to fund the perk, but neither the employee nor the
employer benefits from it. This is the complexity involved in

143. While Professor Soled’s article discusses in-kind benefits in general, his arguments are
equally applicable in the context of employer-provided perks. See Jay A. Soled, Surrogate
Taxation and the Second-Best Answer to the In-Kind Benefit Valuation Riddle, 2012 BYU L.
REV. 153, 158 (2012).
144. See Sherr, supra note 2.
145. Soled, supra note 143, at 154.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 154–55.
148. Id. at 155.
149. See generally supra note 49.
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measuring the value of perks. From a corporate governance
standpoint, this lack of transparency poses a threat to a healthy
balancing of interests between shareholders and management.
A. PERKS LARGELY UNADDRESSED BY THE LAW
Shareholders may be upset that excessive perks have
undervalued their share value. In addition to being crippled by an
inadequate system of measuring the value of perks, shareholders are
not afforded any meaningful legal recourse under the current state of
the law. Several scholars have recognized that permitting this type of
“value diversion” imposes a cost on shareholders that potentially
reduces share value.150 Assuming that shareholders perceive the costs
of these perks as substantially outweighing their benefits, what legal
remedies might shareholders employ to effect the change they
desire?151 The most applicable avenue to pursue is to file a derivative
suit challenging the lavish perks as a waste of corporate assets, but the
hurdles shareholders must jump through make this option virtually a
nonoption.152
As part of the duty of care, directors have an obligation not to
waste corporate assets by overpaying for property or employment
services.153 Corporate waste occurs when a corporation is caused to
effect a transaction on terms that no person of ordinary and sound
business judgment could conclude represents a fair exchange.154 To
succeed on a corporate waste claim, a shareholder plaintiff must
prove that no such person could even “entertain the view that [the
transaction under attack] represented a fair exchange.”155 Thus, for
150. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Christine Jolls, Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder
Wealth, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 487, 501 (1999).
151. See Michael J. Biles & Kimberly G. Davis, Keeping Current: Corporate Compensation,
ABA BUS. LAW SECTION (2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/
2009/09/keeping-current-compensation-200909.authcheckdam.pdf.
152. While recent lawsuits demonstrate an emerging trend of shareholder plaintiffs raising
allegations that directors’ pay is excessive, less attention has been given to perks given to the
average employee.
See Two Lawsuits Brought Over Alleged Excessive Director
Compensation, MERIDIAN COMP. PARTNERS (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.meridiancp.com/in
sights/thought-leadership/two-lawsuits-brought-over-alleged-excessive-director-compensation/.
153. Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
154. Id.
155. Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
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liability to exist, the defendants must have approved a transaction
exchanging something of value for consideration so inadequate that
“no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it
worth what the corporation has paid.”156 If, under the circumstances,
any reasonable person might conclude that the deal made sense, then
the judicial inquiry ends.
Because directors are presumed to have acted properly, the
business judgment rule places the burden on the “party challenging
the [board’s] decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption.”157
If a shareholder plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the business
judgment rule functions to protect the decisions that the officers and
directors made in the course of their duties.158 If, however, a plaintiff
successfully establishes facts rebutting the rule’s presumptions, “the
burden shifts to the defendant directors to prove the ‘entire fairness’
of the transaction.”159
The business judgment rule is a high hurdle, one that is very
rarely satisfied by a shareholder plaintiff. For the most part, courts
view that a finding of waste is appropriate only in “unconscionable
cases” where the directors “irrationally squander or give away
corporate assets.”160 The difficulty of this test reflects the law’s
understanding of what rules will help promote productive economic
activity. If courts were permitted more freely to “second guess”
business decisions, officers and directors will be less inclined to
approve risky transactions.161
Corporate waste allegations have been lodged regarding
compensation of senior officers and directors with varying degrees of
success. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation is one of the
most prominent cases involving such corporate waste allegations.162
In 2005, shareholders of the Walt Disney Company filed a lawsuit
alleging waste and breach of fiduciary duty claims against the
156. Id.; see also Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979).
157. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995).
158. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001).
159. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000); see also Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d
277, 287 (Del. 2003) (“[W]hen the presumption of the business judgment rule has been rebutted,
the entire fairness rule is implicated and defendants bear the burden of proof.”).
160. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000).
161. Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995).
162. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., et al., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
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directors.163 The shareholder plaintiffs claimed that the $130-million
exit package that executive president and director Michael Ovitz
received after just fourteen months of work constituted waste.164
After a thirty-seven-day trial before the Chancery Court, the
shareholder plaintiffs did not prevail because they could not rebut the
presumption of the business judgment rule.165 The trial court found
that a large severance package alone is not enough to show a lack of
due care or to constitute waste. The Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed the decision.166 While the shareholders did not ultimately
prevail, the fact that the corporate waste allegations survived through
trial demonstrates two important points: excessive benefits is a cause
of alarm to shareholders, and the courts are prepared to confront
corporate waste claims.
Similarly, in 2009, a Delaware Chancery Court upheld a claim
brought derivatively by shareholders for waste, where Citigroup
awarded its outgoing CEO a retirement package worth $68 million.167
Shareholder plaintiffs alleged that the multimillion-dollar
compensation constituted waste because the departing CEO was
allegedly responsible for the loss of billions of dollars to the
company.168 The court permitted the plaintiffs’ suit to move forward
because the complaint contained well-pleaded factual allegations
regarding the claim for waste. The court’s decision and this initial
victory for shareholders “signaled that large executive compensation
packages paid by corporations that lose money may not survive
corporate waste analysis.”169
Despite the attention given to executive compensation, employee
compensation largely remains within the realm of the business
judgment rule. While it might be good policy for judges to err on not
questioning a company’s compensation of its executives, which
Id. at 697.
Id.
Id. at 748.
See supra note 162, at 28 (Del. 2006).
In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009).
Id.
Herbert F. Kozlov et al., In Re Citigroup: Delware Court of Chancery Allows Claim for
Corporate Waste Based on Executive Compensation to Proceed, But Dismisses “Hindsight”
Fiduciary Duty Claims, REED SMITH: CORPORATE ALERT (2009), http://www.reedsmith.com/
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

files/Publication/217a3b75-30a4-40d5-b38b-b6967113eaf8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
119c3ebf-553c-4453-aa74-2359c58e4fa2/alert09077.pdf.

74

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 12:1

involves only a handful of individuals in a corporation, is the same
policy sensible when applied to employee perks? There is an
important distinction between executive compensation and employee
perks: the sheer volume of people involved is drastically different.
For example, Google had 43,862 employees in 2013.170 In contrast, its
executive and senior leadership is comprised of only twenty
members.171
To have a chance of success, or even a partial victory as in the
case of Citigroup shareholders,172 shareholders would have to
persuade the court on one important point: The business judgment
rule should be applied on a national context as opposed to a localized
or industry standard.173 That is, the decisions that directors make
regarding employee perks should be compared to the decisions of all
other employers in the nation, and not only to the technology
companies in Silicon Valley.
It is difficult, if not impossible, for a court to consider the
business judgment of a company’s directors in a vacuum. The court
must examine that company’s decisions relative to the decisions of
other companies.
The question then becomes: what is the
composition of this other group? Potentially, this other group might
comprise of similarly situated companies: technology companies
located in Silicon Valley. However, beyond their similar industrial
classification and shared geographical location, the underlying
rationale for the policy of providing perks remains the same.
Logically, all companies strive to recruit and retain talented
employees, so what makes the technology industry so different that
they feel the need to set a new industry standard?
There is no reason why technology companies in Silicon Valley
should be treated any differently than the rest of the nation. These
companies have been characterized as “outliers” in terms of the
170. 2015 Financial Tables, GOOGLE INVESTOR RELATIONS, https://investor.google.com/
financial/tables.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
171. Management Team, GOOGLE COMPANY, http://www.google.com/about/company/facts/
management/#sectio-leadership (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
172. Supra note 167, at 106.
173. In addition to this point, shareholders will still be bound by the standard requirements
for bringing a corporate waste claim. Shareholders will have to be very specific on their
allegations, rather than general claims, and provide concrete evidence. See surpa note 156, at
223; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. Ch. 1984).
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benefits to provide to employees.174 They are known to experiment
with the types of perks they provide. But to what extent does
deviating from the norm get rewarded, or exempted from the
responsibilities of the rest of their peers? In fact, new developments
in benefits in other parts of the economy reflect a trend going in the
opposite direction.175 Generally, employee benefits provided by
companies located elsewhere in the United States do not resemble
those provided in Silicon Valley.176 Employers are increasingly
cutting back on benefits, such as retirement plans and health care,
which used to be a standard component of a full-time employment
package.177 According to the Employee Benefit Research Institute,
the percentage of workers with a retirement plan from their employer
dropped from forty-seven percent in 1992 to below thirty-five percent
a decade later.178 Additionally, between the year 2000 and 2010, the
percentage of employees with employer provided health benefits had
dropped by ten percent, and has continued to decline since then.179
Ultimately, this data suggests that technology companies in
Silicon Valley are offering more perks, in terms of type, scale, and
value. At present, more might be better for some employees.
However, companies should consider other important factors,
including tax consequences,180 shareholder value,181 and industry
practices.182 Once these factors are taken into account, the benefits of
a practice of offering extensive perks become less apparent. Should
shareholders wish to pursue legal recourse as a consequence, the
current legal framework is ineffective.

174. Christina Farr, Silicon Valley Takes Benefits “Arms Race” to Health Care, REUTERS
(Oct. 2, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/02/tech-benefits-idUSL2N0RO
28D20141002 (quoting Jennifer Benz, Chief Executive of Benz Consulting).
175. Peter Cappelli, Google Adds Benefits, Walmart Cuts Them; Oddly, the Logic Is the
Same, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 7, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/11/google-adds-benefits-walmartcuts-them-oddly-the-logic-is-the-same.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Goodman, supra note 17.
181. Bebchuk & Jolls, supra note 150, at 501.
182. Cappelli, supra note 175.
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B. INCREASED TRANSPARENCY AS AN INTERIM SOLUTION
Against this legal landscape, shareholders could move towards
progress by requesting increased transparency about the in-kind
perks Silicon Valley companies provide to employees. Here,
shareholders should take inspiration from the executive
compensation context, discussed previously relating to the business
judgment rule.183 There are substantial parallels between executive
compensation and employee perks. For one, the impetus behind
introducing legislation is similar: in the former context, the concern
that executive pay has grown to be increasingly excessive,184 and in
the latter, the concern that perks have become extravagant. In both
situations, this excessiveness has led to increased publicity, public
outcries, and concerns from corporate shareholders. And in terms of
shared objectives, both situations call for increased transparency for
the benefit of shareholders.
There are two specific aspects of executive compensation that
should provide guidance on implementing legislation that would
increase transparency on employee perks: the passage of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
(“Dodd-Frank Act”)185 and state laws governing corporate
accounting.186
First, the Dodd-Frank Act mandates shareholder advisory voting
for executive compensation in public corporations.187 This vote,
known as “say-on-pay,” enables shareholders to provide input on the
size and nature of executive compensation packages. Under the
statute, at least “once every [three] years, a proxy or consent or
authorization for an annual or other meeting of the shareholders for
which the proxy solicitation rules of the Commission require

183. See supra, note 163 (discussing the litigation involving corporate waste allegations
against directors for allegedly excessive executive compensation).
184. See Harwell Wells, “No Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 a Year”: The Fight Over
Executive Compensation in 1930s America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689, 690 (2010) (stating that
the issue of excessive compensation in the U.S. arose first during the 1930s).
185. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2010).
186. See Michael J. Biles & Kimberly G. Davis, Corporate Compensation, BUS. L. TODAY (A.B.A.
Bus. L. Section: Keeping Current), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/blt/
2009/09/keeping-current-compensation-200909.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).
187. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 185.

Fall 2015

EMPLOYEE PERKS IN SILICON VALLEY

77

compensation disclosure shall include a separate resolution subject to
shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives.”188 Sayon-pay applies to the company’s CEO as well as executives named in
the company’s proxy compensation table.189
The Dodd-Frank Act is instructive because it is a manifestation
of shareholders’ active efforts to demand increased transparency
when corporate waste becomes a concern. It not only sends the
message to corporate officers and directors that shareholders perceive
a potential problem, but that shareholders will act to address the
problem at the legislative level. Indeed, the passage of the DoddFrank Act and its continued presence in corporate law indicates that
shareholders’ will enjoy a degree of success in demanding increased
transparency.190 As a result, management may be more responsive to
shareholders’ calls for change.
It is important to note, however, that the limited nature of
employee perks in the Silicon Valley region pales in comparison to
the widespread growth of executive compensation throughout the
nation. Employee perks is a unique phenomenon concentrated
mainly in Silicon Valley. Thus, in requesting transparency for
employee perks in Silicon Valley technology companies, shareholders
should be mindful that national legislation like the Dodd-Frank Act
may be difficult to achieve, and progressive change on a smaller scale,
perhaps at the state level, may be the most progressive approach.
This is where state corporate laws provide guidance.
Under some state corporation laws, shareholders may pursue
change in a company’s executive compensation structure by filing a
This type of request allows
“books and records” request.191
shareholders, under certain circumstances, to inspect a company’s

188. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 185.
189. Sharholder Approval of Executive Compensation, Frequency of Votes for Approval of
Executive Compensation and Shareholder Approval of Golden Parachute Compensation, 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-21(a) (2011).
190. Though the Dodd-Frank Act may have addressed some of the concerns expressed by
shareholders, its effectiveness continues to be debated. See generally Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: A Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection
and Heightening Corporate Responsibility in International Financial Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
1431 (2011); see generally Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of
Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731 (2013).
191. See Biles & Davis, supra note 186.
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records.192 For example, under Delaware General Corporations Law,
a shareholder of a Delaware corporation has a statutory right to
inspect the books and records of the corporation.193 To exercise this
right, the shareholder must satisfy form and manner requirements
and have a proper purpose for the inspection. A “proper purpose” is
defined as any purpose “reasonably related to such person’s interest
as a stockholder.”194 California’s Corporations Code sets forth a
similar minimum level of information that shareholders may access.
Under section 1601, “[t]he accounting books and records and minutes
of proceedings of the shareholders and the board and committees of
the board . . . shall be open to inspection upon the written demand on
the corporation of any shareholder . . . for a purpose reasonably
related to the holder’s interest as a shareholder.”195
As with the Dodd-Frank Act, a right to access the “books and
records” of a company has its shortcomings. Executive officers and
directors may be reluctant to hand the documents over.196
Shareholders may be forced to resort to filing a motion with the
court. In 2009, a shareholder at Chesapeake Energy in Oklahoma did
just that, after the company’s directors awarded a $75-million bonus
to its chief executive even as the company’s stock plummeted.197
Additionally, a filing with a court does not guarantee a right of
inspection. A court may deny a request altogether “if the corporation
can show that the request is adverse to the interests of the
corporation, or if it would unreasonably burden the corporation.”198
Additionally, a “books and records” request can provide access to
information, but does not ensure that a shareholder’s concerns
subsequent to the inspection will be acknowledged. The burden will
fall to the shareholder to press for accountability and change.
192. Id.
193. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (West 2010).
194. Supra note 193.
195. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1601 (West 1977).
196. Jerry Burleson, Shareholder Demand for Inspection of Records in California under
Corporation Code § 1601, JERRY BURLESON, http://www.jerryburleson.com/shareholder-rights/share
holder-demand-for-inspection-of-records-in-california-under-corporation-code-§1601/ (stating that
requests to inspect corporate records may trigger corporate defensive interests) (last visited Oct. 29,
2015).
197. Gretchen Morgenson, Shareholders Who Act Like Owners, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/business/29gret.html?_r=0.
198. Burleson, supra note 196.
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Taking into account the advantages and shortcomings of the
Dodd-Frank Act and the relevant corporations laws intended to
increase transparency, shareholders can begin to craft legislation that
will directly address concerns involving excessive employee perks. By
leveraging this information in conjunction with a broad understanding
of the corporate waste doctrine and the business judgment rule,
shareholders will be able to adeptly shape the precise contours of
effective legislation.
V. CONCLUSION
As the practice of providing employee perks climbs at an
alarming rate, the need to pause and consider the practical and legal
ramifications intensifies. While Silicon Valley technology companies
have enjoyed economic advantages from this practice to date,
corporate management and shareholders alike should take notice of
impending changes in tax law relating to these perks. Shareholders
will consequently see the challenges in measuring how the receipt of
in-kind perks contributes to an employee’s work performance.
Shareholders who wish to challenge this practice will similarly realize
that the corporate legal framework provides no effective means of
recourse.
The technology sector in California is booming in a way not seen
since the dot-com bubble,199 and it is important for shareholders to
prepare for changes in both the law and the economy. As
shareholders should realize, employee perks—like executive
compensation—can become a liability, if not kept in check.200 Silicon
Valley technology companies, as leading innovators, should proceed
with caution rather than falling to peer pressure in an arms race. This
Note seeks to foster a conversation regarding the long-term
consequences of this practice in order to prepare companies and
shareholders for impending changes in the law, so that all
stakeholders can adequately protect their interests.
199. Paul Sebastien, Silicon Valley’s Maturity Problem, RE/CODE (Apr. 21, 2015, 7:00 AM PDT),
http://recode.net/2015/04/21/silicon-valleys-maturity-problem/.
200. Matt O’Brien, What the Boss Makes: CEO Pay Getting More Ire from Shareholders, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_28568465/what-boss-makes-ceopay-getting-more-ire (last visited Oct. 29, 2015).

